The "red line" of international law that Armenia and Iran should know

Today, several statements from Armenia's Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan regarding peace talks with Azerbaijan and other existing issues in this context have been circulated in the Yerevan media. The main point of interest in these statements is that Armenia appears to lack a clear plan or vision for its own future, as well as for the future of the South Caucasus. Moreover, Mirzoyan's subtle critique of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's handling of the technical aspects of the peace agreement draft suggests internal disagreements within the Armenian government.

Yes, making progress in the “peace process” between Azerbaijan and Armenia is always challenging, and this must be acknowledged. However, recent statements from both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister of Armenia regarding the normalization of relations with Azerbaijan indicate that problems persist with the Peace Agreement and the opening of the Zangezur Corridor. The differences between the positions of the two sides undoubtedly complicate efforts to achieve long-term stability in the South Caucasus. But the issue is that these differences arise from Azerbaijan’s adherence to international legal principles, whereas Armenia continues to act based on the inertia of its 30-year occupation policy.

The ongoing negotiations over the peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia are crucial for achieving peace in the region. However, several unresolved provisions between the two sides are hindering this process. The spokesperson for Azerbaijan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Aykhan Hajizade, stated today that Armenia's proposed comments are not satisfactory for Azerbaijan. According to him, Armenia suggests removing certain critical clauses from the draft, which obstructs the resolution of issues between the parties.

Mr. Hajizade's statement reveals that Armenia is attempting to simplify the project and sign the agreement merely for the sake of signing it, without addressing the core issues. Azerbaijan's position is that only a comprehensive peace agreement that clarifies all problematic issues can be functional and sustainable. The fact that there are still unresolved matters between the sides suggests that the negotiations could continue for a long time – it seems that this is what official Yerevan desires.

Official Baku’s perspective is entirely different. As Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has openly declared, Armenia’s preservation of territorial claims against Azerbaijan in its Constitution makes it impossible to achieve peace between the two countries. The continuation of these claims in legal normative documents undermines trust in the “peace process” and provides revanchist forces in Armenia with the opportunity to label any signed agreement as “unconstitutional” in the future.
On the other hand, Armenia’s attempt to revive the activities of the Minsk Group is also unacceptable to Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan emphasizes that this mechanism is now in the past and no longer corresponds to the current realities in the region. For Azerbaijan, the main issue now is for Armenia to renounce its territorial claims in its legal acts and to adopt a political course consistent with international law principles and norms. One such principle is expressed in Latin as "pacta sunt servanda," which means "Agreements must be kept." This principle forms the foundation of international law and, if my memory serves me correctly, is enshrined in numerous international documents, including the Charter of the United Nations.

According to this principle, once international agreements and treaties are signed, the parties must fulfill their obligations as outlined in those documents in a sincere and complete manner. The violation of this principle leads to a decrease in trust between the parties, weakens the legal basis created for peace and stability, and heightens tensions in interstate relations. For instance, Armenia’s failure to fulfill its obligation, based on the Trilateral Statement, to open the route that would connect mainland Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan poses challenges for the Peace Agreement and regional stability.

Armenia’s failure to meet its commitments regarding the opening of communication routes impedes the development of economic and trade relations in the region. The opening of the transport corridor connecting Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan could create significant economic opportunities for both countries. However, over the past four years, Armenia has not taken any serious steps to make progress on this issue. This complicates the normalization of relations in the region. Furthermore, Armenia’s proposals regarding the involvement of private companies in the process are entirely rejected by Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan has never and will never discuss anything related to a “third party” on its territory.

The conflicting positions between the parties also affect the geopolitical dynamics in the South Caucasus. Armenia's failure to fully comply with its obligations under the Trilateral Statement has led to reminders from Russia, a co-signatory of the agreement, to Yerevan. In response to these reminders, Tehran has also remembered that the "Zangezur Corridor" is supposedly the “red line” of the theocratic regime.

Let us set aside how Tehran justifies the issue for domestic and foreign audiences, and try to understand what Tehran is truly concerned about. In the Second Karabakh War, despite its false prayers and feigned joy at our victory, Iran, which practically supported Armenia and even partially hindered the advance of our army, was also defeated by Azerbaijan. The destruction of the so-called “Artsakh” means that Iran’s ambitions in the region have also been thwarted, both directly and indirectly. Now, Iran is trying to recover the interests it lost in Karabakh by focusing on Zangezur.

First, Iran believes that the opening of the Zangezur Corridor will strengthen Azerbaijan’s position in the South Caucasus and increase Turkey’s influence in the region. This causes Iran to worry about a shift in the regional balance.

Second, the Zangezur Corridor could reduce the importance of transportation routes passing through Armenia and Iran. Additionally, if the Zangezur Corridor opens, Iran fears losing its transit advantages as Azerbaijan’s direct connections with Nakhchivan and Turkey would be strengthened. For this reason, Iran is strengthening its relations with Armenia to block the Zangezur Corridor, even provoking Yerevan into actions against Azerbaijan. All of this raises the question: Can Armenia, relying solely on Iran, prevent the opening of the Zangezur Corridor?

Armenia’s chances of preventing the opening of the Zangezur Corridor by relying solely on Iran are virtually nonexistent. First and foremost, because the Zangezur Corridor is a project that has garnered broad international interest, and the strategic interests of Russia, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and even many Western countries support the opening of this corridor.

Furthermore, Armenia’s economic and political resources are limited, and relying solely on Iran would not allow it to remain in isolation for an extended period. Therefore, we must return to the beginning of the story once more: Armenia must choose a rational path, overcome its internal psychological challenges, fulfill its obligations, and the Pashinyan government must cease its erratic and opportunistic behavior in international relations, including the ceasefire violations targeting the positions of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces. The latter creates the right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. In this case, the remnants of the occupation army that survived the Second Karabakh War will inevitably be crushed in Western Zangezur.

Taleh SHAHSUVARLI